

A JOINT OPPORTUNITY GONE AWRY: THE 1740 SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE

**A MONOGRAPH
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Naval power played a key role in Britain's eventual decision to declare war on Spain. Britain possessed over 120 ships of the line while Spain could only assemble forty. Such an overmatch in British sea power was tempered in the knowledge that should France align with Spain, an additional fifty ships of the line and a large land army could enter into the struggle. Britain's administration realistically understood that facing Spain or France on the continent with her small army was ludicrous. However, a naval war would be an entirely different matter. Spain's New World colonies were at the end of a vulnerable line of communication (LOC) and should Britain muster sufficient military forces, then the seizure of Spain's most important ports would be possible through joint military operations. With control of the ports and markets, Britain would garner considerable commercial and military riches at Spain's expense.

General James Oglethorpe, founder of the British colony of Georgia and semi-professional soldier, was able to convince the South Carolina Legislature and the Royal Navy Acting Commodore, Captain Vincent Pearce, (the on station naval commander), to assist him in capturing the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine. If the British were successful, then all of Florida might become a British possession and dramatically change the political stage of North America.

Oglethorpe did not succeed in taking St. Augustine for a variety of reasons. One of the causes cited for the joint force's failure was the alleged inaction or malingering of the naval arm. This monograph will examine the joint aspects of this failed campaign, analyze the methodology of the opposing commanders, provide a balanced narrative of the expedition, and finally prove that the Royal Naval squadron did a credible job in assisting the land component in attaining its campaign objective and was not the proximate cause of the expedition's failure.


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INTRODUCTION


The difficulty of properly employing joint military forces has been a constant theme in the annals of military history. Command friction between land and naval forces, particularly in the British military experience, while much smoother today, has often served as a painful example of 'how not to do it' to other contemporary military planners.¹ Historically, military ventures that require cooperation between land and naval components are often the most difficult to undertake, primarily due to differences in command philosophy, conflict over choosing the overall commander, operational strategies and aims, and the failure to appreciate or understand the capabilities and limitations of the other service.² The recent successes in joint coalition warfare enjoyed in the Gulf War came as the result of a successive evolution in inter-service cooperation. This evolutionary process is jerky at best with failure often being more characteristic than success. Britain's joint evolutionary path is sown with both dismal failures and clear successes. Frequently during the early stages of a conflict, the Royal Navy and the British Army experienced an institutional friction or 'joint dysfunction' in working with their sister service. Over the course of the war, however, they became more adept at functioning as a joint team, which enabled them to better carry out the war aims of the crown. However, at the end of every conflict there was no capturing lesson learned or writing any type of joint manual or regulation to guide future joint operations based on the recent war. At the outbreak of the next war, joint cooperation had to be 'relearned'

and the professional relationship between the two forces depended in a large measure upon the personal relationship between the two component commanders and not on a common outlook or doctrine.

On several occasions Great Britain achieved outstanding joint synergy because of the ability of some of their naval and land commanders to share a joint vision for success and, most importantly, were willing to put aside service parochialism and subordinate their role for the overall good. A particularly good example of this cooperative spirit can be seen in the Peninsular War of 1807 through 1814. Britain's military achieved a high water mark in joint operations in this contest against Napoleon. The relationship between the Duke of Wellington and Admiral George Cranfield Berkeley in Lisbon, and to a lesser extent, the cooperation enjoyed between General Sir Thomas Graham and Admiral Sir Richard Keats during the Siege of Cadiz, stand out as exceptional examples of joint cooperation because of the effective complementary and cooperative relationship which was fostered and developed between the land component commander and his naval counterpart. Such was not usually the case in British history, especially in the century prior to the Wars of Napoleon. The Royal Navy was the senior service in the United Kingdom and with each new war the British Army had to undergo the trials of expansion and growth, with all of its accompanying pains and failures. Eventually the army would achieve a considerable level of efficiency, but immediately following the war, the army was largely demobilized and its attendant experience lost. The cycle would begin anew at the start of the next conflict while the Royal Navy continued to be relatively robust and untouched by post war downsizing. This constant up/down cycle in British defense readiness was a deleterious contributing factor in one of the earliest examples of Britain's

failure to attain joint synergy. This particular failure took place during the early phase of the War of Jenkin's Ear in colonial North America's oldest city, Saint Augustine, Florida, in 1740.³

The War of Jenkin's Ear, begun in 1739 between Great Britain and Spain, eventually blossomed into the larger War of the Austrian Succession in late 1740. The two nations had long vied for control of the New World. With the British colonies north of the Spanish colony of Florida secure and in general prospering in the early eighteenth century, Britain desired to expand her sphere of economic and political influence in North America at Spain's expense. Access to Spanish markets in the Caribbean and South America was an important policy goal of several British administrations. All through the 1720s and 30s growing tensions between the two maritime powers threatened to plunge Europe again into a large-scale war and upset the balance of power.⁴



Map of the Area of Operations

For most of the latter half of the 1730s patient diplomacy had been able to stop the rush towards war. Both sides made timely concessions, having other concerns dominate foreign affairs. Britain's commercial firms were in a quandary concerning Spain. Approximately half of her trade with Iberian Spain was legitimate and lucrative, while the other half of the market was comprised of smuggling, black marketing, and feeding an insatiable Spanish need for more slaves to work her colonial mines. Both merchant factions generally canceled one another out in seeking political succor to forward their prospective positions.

Spain was properly concerned by the growing economic power of England. The threat of losing vital colonial markets in the New World to the juggernaut of British mercantilism was legitimate. The cost of maintaining a sizeable naval force to blockade British smugglers, combating the illegal actions of Spanish colonists in aiding British smugglers, and halting the increasing encroachment of British settlers along the disputed boundary between British Georgia and Spanish Florida, ratcheted up tensions between the two nations. Also influencing the decision to go to war was Britain's refusal to return Gibraltar to Spain despite the terms of the recent Treaty of Utrecht. Disputes over logwood for naval stores and Britain's attempts to drive a wedge between Bourbon Spain and France also contributed to a climate conducive to war. Giving in to the strong undercurrent of war generated by public opinion, mercantile interests, and parliamentary expansionist, Great Britain declared war in October 1739.


Naval power played a key role in influencing Britain's decision to commence hostilities. Britain possessed over 120 ships of the line while Spain could muster but forty. Such an overmatch in British seapower was tempered in the knowledge that should

France align with Spain; an additional fifty ships of the line and a large land army could be brought into the struggle. Britain's administration realistically understood that facing Spain or France on the continent with her small army was ludicrous. However, a naval war would be an entirely different matter. Spain's New World colonies were at the end of a vulnerable LOC and if sufficient military forces could be assembled, then the seizure of Spain's most important ports would be possible through joint military operations. With control of the ports and hence markets, Britain would garner considerable commercial and military riches at Spain's expense.

As robust as Britain was in naval power she was diametrically feeble in land power. Still suffering from the Cromwell induced phobia of maintaining a large standing army and further exacerbated by the recent fiscally prudent policies of Sir Robert Walpole to trim the government's budget, Britain faced a severe soldier shortage in her declared war with Spain. Engaging Spain in combat concurrently in the European and American theaters would stretch Britain's finite troop assets to the breaking point. However, the dearth of soldiers in the regular British Army to serve in the Americas could be offset by recruiting and outfitting colonial recruits in their stead. Sir James Oglethorpe, the founder of Georgia, had already proven himself a capable soldier and his offer of raising a sizeable military force for colonial military operations was welcomed by the Crown. Having earned a solid soldierly reputation on the continent under the famous Great Captain, Prince Eugene of Savoy, coupled with a recent string of military successes against various Indian and Spanish forces gave the persuasive Oglethorpe the necessary credentials to win support.⁵

CHAPTER ONE: "A Combative General"

The coquina stone fortress of Castillo de San Marcos, strategically positioned at the Matanzas Bay inlet of St. Augustine, still stoically guards the northern reaches of Spain's erstwhile Florida frontier. Instead of discouraging invasion by hostile Indians or land hungry British colonists, Castillo de San Marcos today serves as an alluring beacon to the discriminating tourist, who probably finds the charming quaintness of Saint Augustine as attractive as the ruthlessly expansionist, yet idealistic founder of colonial Georgia, General James Oglethorpe.⁶ Oglethorpe's clear failure to competently command a military expedition to wrest control of St. Augustine in 1740 to gain Florida for Britain, and more ominously, his neglect to adequately prepare for this important mission, resulted in a stinging defeat for Britain's colonial ambitions towards Florida.⁷



Entrance of the Castillo de San Marcos


Oglethorpe was pitted against the competent Spanish Governor of Florida, Don Manuel De Montiano. Unlike several previous governors, Montiano exercised resolute and proactive leadership and his determined resistance against the British successfully stymied English expansion into Spain's Florida for an additional twenty-three years.⁸ An analysis of this key siege demonstrates that Britain's Royal Navy provided excellent support to the land component in capturing the Castillo de San Marcos. Yet, Oglethorpe was generally able to escape appropriate culpability for his mishandling of the joint venture, and, by proxy, the Royal Navy earned undue and unjust criticism from the ill-commanded expedition to capture the Vauban-style fortress.⁹ Dooming the abortive expedition were many factors, foremost of which was Oglethorpe's miscalculation of Spanish reactions and Montiano's clear competence. He neglected to procure sufficient siege train, sappers, and engineers and failed to enforce unity of command within his combined regular and two-state militia force. It is the intent of this monograph to demonstrate that it was a combination of other factors, and not alleged naval intransigence, which caused the expedition's downfall.¹⁰

The 1739 War of Jenkin's Ear in many ways was merely a colonial continuation of the earlier 1702 Queen Anne's War despite the terms of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht.¹¹ Tensions remained high in the clashing colonies despite the signed peace,¹² with both sides increasing privateering and committing border raids. Indian allies of both sides committed atrocities in hit and run raids and destabilized the border regions.¹³ British merchants took advantage of the absence of official hostilities and used this window of opportunity to ship large amounts of illegal goods to the Spanish colonies, Florida included. In an effort to curtail the loss of import duty income, Spanish officials stepped

up the interdiction of British smugglers and took harsh measures to end the illegal trade. Official hostilities recommenced because of the widespread British belief in the testimony of a British merchant ship captain and smuggler, Robert Banks Jenkin, who before Parliament testified that Spanish sailors had boarded his ship illegally, mistreated his crew, and then cut off his ear for his protests.¹⁴ Jenkin's ship had been caught smuggling, however this was often overlooked by a protective and outraged British public. Previous to Jenkin's questionable Parliamentary tale in which he proclaimed himself to be a hapless victim of Spanish depravations,¹⁵ Spain's King, Philip V, approved the offensive plan of the aggressive Cuban Governor Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas to preemptively raid Charleston in the Carolinas.¹⁶ The well-prepared raid was canceled literally only hours before departure when a fresh dispatch from Madrid bade the Cubans to postpone hostilities and to allow diplomacy to continue to defuse colonial tensions.¹⁷ Without this preemptive attack on Britain's southern stronghold, the martial initiative in the colonies shifted to the English, and, by circumstance, to a resourceful and convincing Oglethorpe.¹⁸ The British Admiralty in London, too, wanted to strike an early and decisive blow but realized that access to their primary markets in Europe could be severely threatened by a vengeful Spain if they prematurely embroiled England in an all-out European War.¹⁹

Oglethorpe had long coveted Florida. It was a natural extension of 'his Georgia' and would provide an even larger buffer zone between the British colonies and Spain's Central America's colonies and deny Spain a sizable portion of the Gulf of Mexico's northern coast. Such a strategic position also promised to moderate the benefits enjoyed by Bourbon France in its central Mississippi River Valley territories.²⁰ Additionally, if

St. Augustine were under the Union Jack, then Spanish specie-laden ships would be easier to prey upon because they would have to pass between the British held Bahamas and St. Augustine in order to benefit from the eastward flowing Gulf Stream in their return voyage to Europe.²¹



Northwest corner of the Castillo de San Marcos

Oglethorpe lacked the requisite manpower to conduct such a daring operation on his own (with only some Georgia Rangers and a small regiment of regulars, the 42nd Foote, at his disposal),²² so he petitioned the South Carolina Legislature to grant him sufficient militiamen to supplement his meager forces.²³ Such an audacious mission doubtless struck the legislature as being too difficult for any colonial force; yet it gained credibility when proposed by the forceful and articulate general. Oglethorpe had previously tried to persuade the reluctant Carolinians to agree to his plan but each time had met a cool response. However, by late 1739 the increased tensions between the two

empires brought about by an inflamed public opinion over "Jenkin's Ear," and a palpable increase in mutual privateering helped to transform the more complacent South Carolinians' mood.²⁴ It seem that all sides more or less desired not to fight, however mutual fears that the opponent was prepared to fight and might launch a preemptive strike increased the overall likelihood of conflict. Despite the reservations of both sides, this tragic escalation in tensions led to war.

An important element existed in Oglethorpe's plan to take St. Augustine—in order to succeed it relied almost entirely on surprising the defenders and isolating the Castillo from the sea, before the arrival of any reinforcements from either Cuba or Panama. If unable to achieve either of these, Oglethorpe would have to conduct a more formal, time-intensive siege, necessitating a considerably greater logistical and engineering effort.²⁵

Although the South Carolinians were more disposed towards supporting Oglethorpe by late 1739, they still required further encouragement. An obliging Oglethorpe provided the means by way of a small victory to hearten the unenthusiastic Carolinians. On 1 January 1740, he led a small amphibious detachment up the St. Johns River (the traditional boundary between British Georgia and Spanish Florida) and successfully captured the Spanish fort of San Francisco de Pupo, due south of current day Jacksonville.²⁶ He left Lieutenant Hugh Mackay Jr. in command of the small remote garrison while he returned with the bulk of his forces to Georgia to relay his good news and begin the necessary preparations for the expected contest at St. Augustine.²⁷ Oglethorpe, hoping to receive official colonial sanction for his special expedition,²⁸ traveled again to Charleston to cajole and convince the still reluctant legislature into providing him with the necessary militia augmentation and vital logistical support

required for the expedition.²⁹ Georgia's small population could not provide the necessary manpower for an operation of the magnitude that Oglethorpe envisioned. However, he was unsuccessful in convincing the assembly to support his petition, despite the recent military success at Fort Pupo and his incredible offer to loan his own money to the legislature at a loss if they would 'but just' underwrite the mission.³⁰


Clearly frustrated, Oglethorpe turned to the Royal Navy (as he would do so often in the next three months) for assistance.³¹ Acting Royal Naval station commodore, Captain Vincent Pearce who commanded the ad hoc southern colonies naval squadron, came to his aid.³² In support of Oglethorpe's plan they jointly addressed the South Carolina legislature where Pearce stated, "That he would answer for it, if the place should have no relief by sea, and that they ought all to be hanged if they did not take it in a very short time."³³ The combined entreaty of the two professional military men had the desired effect on the South Carolina Assembly and they passed an act authorizing logistical and military support for the punitive expedition on 5 April 1740.³⁴ Not all believed in the ease of the operation or shared the optimism of the two commanders. On 7 April the Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, William Bull, wrote to Oglethorpe,

In observance of his Majesty's orders...the Commander of his Majesty's ships having been acquainted therewith did accordingly and carefully see and cruise off this coast in order to defend these frontier colonies; ...*the commander of his Majesties ships have appeared ready and willing on several former occasions that I hope we shall not waste their assistance upon this.* (Sic, this author's emphasis)³⁵

The South Carolina Lieutenant Governor's insight on not wanting to waste valuable naval assets on fruitless or impossible tasks came quite close to unfortunate reality. Undaunted

by the Bull's misgivings, Oglethorpe now had all the ingredients needed for a successful joint venture, especially critical, a fully responsive and supportive naval commander.³⁶

Pearce promised complete cooperation and began to prepare for the operation. Pearce did not have a fully operational squadron. In a cost cutting move the Admiralty could only fund one active squadron in the Caribbean and Jamaica was a relatively long way to



Southwest corner of the Castillo de San Marcos

Charleston. Pearce had to assemble his disbursed force from ports all over the colony's Atlantic coast and then organize them for the operation. He too had his share of challenges.³⁷

Great Britain experienced a difficult quandary in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. While she possessed a first class fleet and excellent shipyards, her populace was finite and any long-term struggle, which reduced her trade, would have a highly deleterious effect on her ability to sustain a long war. If Spain and France were

able to gain naval superiority for even a few short hours on the English Channel, then an invasion of the home isles was a legitimate possibility. With an overseas empire stretching from colonial America to the far reaches of the south Pacific and India, Britain had a scope of responsibilities that no other European power would face. The British Admiralty had to be careful in selecting objectives for naval operations because any misplacement of naval power might provide an advantage to her enemies.

As the land contingent of Oglethorpe's expedition collected the requisite supplies and necessary manpower, Governor Montiano prepared his defenses for the impending attack upon St. Augustine.³⁸ Fortunately for the Spaniards, rehabilitative efforts over the past decade on the Castillo's defenses yielded positive results. The fort was in a far better defensive posture in 1740 than in the previous decade. Montiano was an active commander and made military preparedness one of his major objectives. He courted Indian allies and sent emissaries far into the western edges of Spanish Florida to rally support on behalf of his king. Not as successful in aligning Indian support as Oglethorpe due to a paucity of funds, he nonetheless was able to cement defensive relations with several obliging tribes in the event of a British invasion.³⁹

The Castillo de San Marcos was surrounded on the south and west sides by open fields that were easily covered by Spanish cannon. Its defenses were complemented on the north side by a tidal marsh area, with its remaining wall on the sea. In all, the Castillo was well situated to repel a determined land attack. The fort was constructed of Coquina (a stone which was composed of the pressured remains of centuries of dead chalky sea creatures) and was over twenty feet thick in some areas. A large structure, it could hold a considerable amount of defenders and supplies.⁴⁰ However, the struggling Spanish


colony could not provide all of the necessities for its recently augmented garrison of approximately 1,160 men.⁴¹ Governor Montiano sent repeated requests to the Cuban Governor for more food, arms, and soldiers to enable him to withstand the bellicose Oglethorpe.⁴² Fortunately for the Spanish, six small half galleys arrived from Cuba with a timely addition of food. The half galley was a shallow drafted vessel with one sail and with built in supports for light cannon. In the absence of wind the vessel could be rowed for a considerable distance. These small vessels not only gave the garrison some added defensive flexibility and increased security on the waterfront, but they also provided complete freedom of movement within the shallow Mantanzas bay.⁴³ The half galley's shallow draft enabled them to sail freely within the Mantanzas inlet, unlike the deeper keeled British ships which could not clear the sand bars at the harbor's mouth.⁴⁴ Heeding Montiano's pleas for succor, the Cuban governor planned to provide more supplies and men for the vulnerable St. Augustine garrison.

However timely the influx, Montiano still faced severe personnel and logistical shortages. In dire need of defenders, he freed slaves and pardoned convicts to increase the inadequate garrison's size. Surprisingly, on the outskirts of St. Augustine was the town of Fort Mose, which was comprised of freed black slaves. Most were runaway's from the British colonies to the north and now tilled their own soil and sold their crops to the crown to feed the fort and populace of the town.⁴⁵ Montiano stockpiled food, but with the projected increase of townspeople seeking shelter during hostilities, the concerned governor could not hope to long feed them. He wrote to the Cuban Governor,

It is unnecessary to exaggerate to Your Excellency the agony of our situation, for in respect of the amount of supplies in hand, and of the fact

that the population of the this city exceeds 2,400, Your Excellency will easily perceive that we most urgently need help at the first possible moment.⁴⁷

Despite these challenges, Montiano continued to prepare to resist the approaching onslaught of the determined British. The new recruits were drilled and sympathetic Indian scouts maintained a watch on the St. Johns River.



CHAPTER TWO: "A Supportive Admiral Turns South"

By early May, Oglethorpe had assembled an adequate land force to begin the expedition.⁴⁷ Oglethorpe also hired and armed civilian boats and crews to move supplies under the Navy's supervision in support of the expedition.⁴⁸ The advance towards St. Augustine began on 10 May 1740, with the Royal Navy transporting much of the land component to the vicinity of the border, and then debarking them to march further south, roughly paralleling the coast.⁴⁹ Concurrently, Pearce refitted and provisioned the rest of his newly organized squadron and dispatched the *HMS Hector* on 2 May to join the *HMS Squirrel* patrolling on station at St. Augustine. Their mission was to garner any fresh intelligence, deny resupply by sea, and intimidate the Spanish population.⁵⁰ The remainder of Pearce's squadron spent the next ten days waiting for the delivery of heavy cannon and mortars for the South Carolinians under the capable command of militia Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen.⁵¹ On 13 May, Pearce and the rest of his squadron sailed south to join Oglethorpe.⁵²

Oglethorpe moved briskly towards his objective. Despite the debilitating effects of the increasingly hot weather and attacks of intestinal illness brought on by drinking water laced with parasites, the mixed force made steady progress south. Oglethorpe needed to capture a series of small Spanish outposts generally running along his projected line of operations in order to secure his rearward communications. Because he had previously captured Fort Pupo, Oglethorpe successfully used a converted Pupo prisoner to talk the garrison of Fort Diego into an almost bloodless surrender.⁵³ Flush with this

minor victory only twenty miles north of the Castillo, Oglethorpe became prematurely optimistic.⁵⁴ Oglethorpe left the bulk of his eclectic force of redcoats, provincial militia, rangers and Indians at Fort Diego while he led an advance party of handpicked men to Point Quartell to recon the terrain and personally examine the enemy's dispositions. Detecting the English in the vicinity, the Spanish conducted a spoiling attack with light infantry and Indian forces against the probing British. Oglethorpe himself bravely led his men in the often dangerous hand-to-hand fighting with these irregular Spanish forces and narrowly won the furious skirmish.⁵⁵ The British successfully repelled the bold counter reconnaissance force, which caused the Spanish to desert the surrounding countryside and barricade themselves inside the Castillo. The defenders wisely chose not to sally out and fight a pitched battle in the open against the numerically superior British. Montiano planned on using the tactical advantage the Castillo gave his small force and waiting for Cuban reinforcement. In abandoning the St. Augustine environs, however, the Spanish bequeathed complete tactical initiative to the attackers.⁵⁶


The only remaining Spanish outpost in the immediate area outside of the Castillo de San Marcos was Fort Mose. A British reconnaissance party revealed that the fort had been hastily evacuated and that its inhabitants had also moved to the Castillo.⁵⁷ On 2 June, Oglethorpe garrisoned Fort Mose with a mixed detachment of regulars, militia, and Indians under the command of Georgia Militia Colonel John Palmer. He ordered them to attack any Spanish foraging parties who might sally forth from San Marcos and actively patrol the environs.⁵⁸ Friction soon developed between the regulars and colonial soldiers inside the small cramped fort. Eventually, the discord within the small command became so great, and discipline so lax, that open arguments broke out among the officers of the

mixed garrison. The end result was that the outposts' security was haphazardly handled and all unity of command dissolved.⁵⁹ In disobeying their officers, small groups of soldiers went into the wood line outside of the fort's walls in order to escape the bickering inside of the small compound. Unfortunately, they posted no sentries and fell asleep, leaving them to the mercy of the night fighting Indians and Spanish.

Oglethorpe, after posting the Mose garrison, returned his attention once again to the Castillo. Unable to tempt Montiano into leaving the fort and joining battle in the open by colorful taunting and marching his troops in the open with colors flying, Oglethorpe then counter-marched back to Fort Diego on 3 June and made more detailed plans to take the Castillo.⁶⁰ Despite grumbling in the ranks, Oglethorpe remained optimistic at capturing the fortress.⁶¹

On 3 June, Pearce's squadron was joined by the *HMS Tartar*, ferrying heavy guns and mortars from South Carolina, thus giving Oglethorpe additional firepower. Pearce called a council of war on 5 June to discuss the navy's role in the siege. He advised Oglethorpe that the longest the fleet could tarry in the Florida waters was until 5 July, because of the inherent dangers posed by the encroaching hurricane season and not having any ports in the vicinity where he could safely ride out the storm. Both commanders also decided that the ships would disembark men and cannons on Anastasia Island to establish an artillery battery. The battery's principal mission was to interdict the annoying Cuban vessels in the harbor, which were out of range of the big ship's guns due to the restraining sand bar at the harbor's mouth.⁶² The battery would also contribute its fires to those of the already established battery at Point Quartell, which was daily sending rounds both into the town and Castillo, causing panic and damaging Spanish morale.⁶³

On 12 June, the British landed a mixed force of 200 seamen and militia on Anastasia Island to build and jointly man the battery, complementing Oglethorpe's already in place land force with needed artillery skills.⁶⁴ The British operation was clearly progressing. Both of the outlying islands were occupied, the Castillo isolated, the artillery batteries in place and bombarding the logistically hamstrung garrison and the elusive half galleys, and the rearward lines of communication to Georgia secure. Oglethorpe's confidence doubtless soared; he had succeeded in isolating St. Augustine and had more than three weeks of naval support remaining until Pearce would be obliged to withdraw because of seasonal storms. Yet Montiano was able to wrest the initiative from the British commander and spoil their time-sensitive plans.



Spanish mortars on top of the Castillo's ramparts

Montiano, bowing to the pressured pleas of his subordinates within the Castillo, authorized an offensive operation to raise sagging Spanish morale and ruin Oglethorpe's timetable. The longer the defenders could hold out, the greater the possibility that a Cuban relief force would arrive and drive off the British. The only realistic objective within reach that might weaken the redcoats would be to strike at the small British garrison at Fort Mose. Montiano gave his concurrence and a Spanish attack party quietly slipped out before midnight on 14 June and moved stealthily towards the Mose garrison. Arriving before daybreak, the Spaniards sent Indians to spy on the fort and gather fresh intelligence for the assault. The Indian scouts returned in the pre-dawn darkness and relayed the glaring ineptitude of the undisciplined British defenders and their overall poor security. British troops were even outside of the perimeter asleep. The Spanish commander, Captain Antonio Salgado, wasted no time in ordering an attack upon the unprepared garrison, and the mixed Spanish and Indian force fell upon the unsuspecting British with complete surprise.

In short order Salgado's troops won a resounding victory, killing sixty-three British troops while only losing ten. The remainder of the garrison fled into the darkness hoping to find Oglethorpe's main body and safety. Salgado began to repair the outpost and sent word to his commander that they had rapidly recaptured the fort.⁶⁵ The substantial setback at Fort Mose was a terrible psychological blow for the British, but it could be a salvageable disaster if properly handled. Reacting out of character, Oglethorpe (already feeling the effects of a returning bout of fever) mentally and emotionally withdrew from the catastrophe and became passive and listless. His reaction to the "Mose Massacre" further disheartened the Carolinians and Georgians and increased the

growing animosity between the two recalcitrant groups.⁶⁶ The Mose garrison suffered from a lack of unity of command and adequate resources for their mission. The sobering effect of the defeat weakened British morale and conversely stiffened Spanish resolve.⁶⁷ Despite the loss, the British still outnumbered the Spanish and had lost no artillery in the Ft. Mose battle. It was at this point that Oglethorpe lost his sense of purpose and instead of setting the example for his men and recovering from the setback, he morally and emotionally withdrew, furthering the plummet of the expedition's morale and esprit.

Despite this setback, several of the other British leaders maintained mission discipline and continued the necessary preparations. Vander Dussen quietly assumed responsibility for the still viable siege and worked with Pearce in coordinating support for the fledgling battery on Anastasia in order to maintain some pressure on the resourceful enemy. Oglethorpe was kept informed by Vander Dussen but did little to influence operations. Vander dussen, functioning as the defacto commander tried to convince Pearce and Oglethorpe with his idea of using the sailor piloted small boats from Pearce's squadron, an augmented force of militia and regulars could overwhelm the half galleys, storm the Castillo's walls, and capture the fort. Oglethorpe was at first vaguely supportive of the plan but became more enamored with it as the siege wore on. The plan was possible, yet the feasibility of success was uncertain. The Cuban half galleys were equipped with 9-pounders and swivel guns, while the largest caliber weapons the limited number of British row boats and launches could mount was a 3-pounder.⁶⁸ Fire superiority clearly lay with the defenders due to the combination of the Castillo's formidable seaward guns coupled with the half galley's familiarity with the bay and larger caliber cannon. The waterborne assault, at best, was an improbable success. Seemingly

roused out of his lethargy, Oglethorpe's frustration with the galleys was clearly reflected in his correspondence, "The Galleys are the most troublesome things we meet with."⁶⁹

Vanderdussen met with naval captain Peter Warren and convinced him of the feasibility of his plan. Captain Warren, working on land with Vanderdussen and supervising his sailors on the land guns, gave initial approval of Vanderdussen's bold plan⁷⁰ and passed it along to Pearce aboard the *HMS Flamborough* for a final decision.⁷¹ Pearce, angry with Warren's concurrence, immediately disapproved the plan. Undaunted, Warren went to see his commander to convince him of the feasibility of the plan. Mr. Lowery Gordon, observing this terse exchange, recorded in his journal on 25 June, "when Captain Warren went on board, the Commodore disapproved of it, and said he was surprised that a Thing of such Consequence should be agreed upon without his Knowledge." (sic)⁷²

Vanderdussen, not accepting defeat, worked to get all concerned to meet and approve the action.⁷³ At a meeting aboard ship Pearce gave in under the persuasive dialogue and approved the operation, but in sober retrospect the following day sent his regrets and again declined to support the action.

Vanderdussen adroitly responded to Pearce's mind change by rowing out to Pearce's ship where he personally reconvinced the reluctant Commodore of the plans' viability. He "argued the necessity of attacking the Galleys, and that the difficulty was not so great as they imagined." Pearce relented and again agreed to support the action.⁷⁴ Shortly thereafter Vanderdussen returned to Anastasia Island and readied plans for the attack. Captain Warren (prompted by a concerned Pearce), wanted to know what type of assistance Vanderdussen's militia could offer in the attack. Vanderdussen responded to Pearce,

Captain Warren told me it would be proper to acquaint you what Embarkation and Forces I proposed to assist you with for destroying those Galleys;...which is two Boats of ten Oars, one of fourteen, two of eight, and three of six Oars, in all eight, besides several Canoes of a smaller size, on board of which I shall put 100 Men that are fit for that Purpose, with proper Officers to command them.⁷⁵

The reliance on rowboats and canoes against the 9-pounders of the Cuban vessels seemed dangerous and foolhardy to Pearce. He wrote to Vanderdussen later that day,

I...shall be glad to do any Thing in my Power to effect what you propose, but as the Case is circumstanced I am afraid the Affair is too hazardous for us to undertake..This under the Circumstances we are in, in regard to the Difference of our Force and theirs and the Passing so near as I am informed by the Pilots to the Fire of their Cannon and Musketry from the Castle and Town before they can come at the Galleys, makes the success so doubtful as requires the most mature Consideration before it is put in Execution.⁷⁶

Pearce's concern also was tempered by the probable loss of skilled seamen in the attack, keenly dangerous in his already short-crewed ships that would have to soon face the challenges of the hurricane season.⁷⁷ The Commodore's sound rationale for his nonoccurrence vexed the aggressive South Carolina militia commander. To overcome the barrier posed by the sand bars, Vanderdussen pleaded for Pearce to empty one of his sloops and attempt to float it over the Mantanzas bar for use in the row boat assault.⁷⁸ Pearce complied and dispatched a small vessel to conduct a sounding of the sand bar's depth to see if a crossing were possible. The sounding revealed that it would be impossible for even a lightened sloop to cross the nine-foot bar.⁷⁹

Thus, the Royal Navy could not readily influence the necessary close combat that would be required to seize the Castillo. Without being able to provide fire support for the 'canoes and rowboat' assault of the land component, Pearce wanted nothing to do with

what he believed to be a foolhardy and desperate plan. The weather now turned against the British as well. On 27 June a heavy rain and squally northeasterner blew in, forcing Pearce to withdraw his squadron out to sea in order to weather what could possibly be the opening gale of an approaching hurricane.⁸⁰ This dangerous storm provided an opening for the Cubans to resupply the beleaguered St. Augustine garrison. The lone British ship HMS Phoenix, posted at the southern entrance of the Mantanzas inlet some fourteen miles south of the Castillo to stop any use of the inlet by the Cubans, withdrew on Pearce's signal to rejoin the squadron at sea to ride out the storm. In her absence a convoy of seven shallow draft Cuban supply ships managed to dash into the unguarded river and start upstream towards the Castillo, almost losing some of the vessels in the immoderate weather.⁸¹ On 3 July the Cubans arrived and began to off load the vital cargoes of food and ammunition. St. Augustine had been resupplied and the window of opportunity opened by the storm was fortuitously used by the Cubans to reach the besieged Castillo. Montiano and the confined hungry garrison thus received a tremendous morale boost at a much-needed time and were consequently better prepared to withstand a long siege.⁸²

Chapter Three: “An Operation Gone Awry”

The successful resupply of the beleaguered Castillo proved to be the culminating point of the campaign.⁸³ The combat power of the British declined while the captive Spanish garrison had received fresh supplies and hope.⁸⁴ While it is always simpler, and to the casual observer it might seem unfair, to find fault with an operation in retrospect, the flaws of the operation must be examined in order to glean relevant insights. Oglethorpe initially possessed overwhelming strength in ground forces and in naval firepower. However, he misjudged Montiano's aggressiveness, the weather's effects on the joint aspects of the operation, and the topography of the bay and surrounding area.⁸⁵ The sand barrier at the bay's mouth was known to many of the sailors in Charleston and Savannah.⁸⁶ Why this knowledge was not shared with the Royal Navy is curious to say the least. Oglethorpe also failed to exploit Spanish weakness due to his haste in preparation. If he had sufficient engineer assets and opened up approach saps and started other siege works, Montiano may have come to grips with the futility of further resistance and surrendered to the seemingly inevitable. But without the necessary train, Oglethorpe could do little to intimidate the Spaniards behind their stout walls into premature capitulation. Pearce was earnest in his desire to assist Oglethorpe in forwarding British colonial military objectives, but his refusal to take part in the "canoe and rowboat assault"

has made him the victim of faint historical damming, doing much to mitigate

Oglethorpe's clear leadership failure.⁸⁷ As Pearce's log indicated,

...at this morning I held a Council of War when the proposal for attacking the six half galleys launching in the harbor and above the Castle of Augustine was maturely considered & debated. Several Strong reasons being shown wherein that Enterprise would be too Hazardous & almost impossible to be attempted with Success, and that the ships could not with Safety spare the number of men to man the boats for that service Twas unanimously agreed that the idea was Impracticable. The General, his Troops, Indians & company were transported over to Point Quartell.⁸⁸ (sic)

Pearce's measures in supporting the land operations of the ill-prepared Oglethorpe were thorough and can be characterized as exceptional joint cooperation by eighteenth-century standards. The small squadron clearly gave superior naval support. Steady supplies of food and ammunition were transported to the land component, speedy delivery of dispatches and orders were made by Pearce's vessels on behalf of the land commander, and transfers of troops and heavy cannon as well as prisoner handling and confinement were performed with alacrity by the naval arm.⁸⁹ However, not all requests for assistance by the land component could be fulfilled by Pearce's command. When Oglethorpe requested sailors to augment his land forces with 200 seamen to man batteries on Anastasia Island on 2 July for an indefinite period to cover his withdrawal, Pearce was forced by practicalities to demur. His rationale for non concurrence is sound,

General Oglethorpe applied to me by his letter on the 2nd instant to leave on shore 200 seamen belonging to his Majesty's ships here, to man one of the batteries on the island of St. Eustatius....could not be complied with for the following reasons.

First, the companies of his Majesty's several ships are so reduced by the number of sick on board, and [the] weakness of the rest by overfatigue in blowing, squally, and rainy weather [that] the remainder would not be able to sail the ships.

Secondly, the time is so far spent, by which each ship's provisions are reduced so low, that it is impossible to leave a sufficient quantity of provisions for them till the return of the ships.

Thirdly, there are not slops on board the fleet sufficient to clothe them, and as seamen have no other way of being supplied with clothes, they must perish with sickness in the rainy season that is now coming on, for want of clothing and necessaries. etc.⁹⁰ (sic)

Earlier in the operation ships' captains Warren, Laws, and Townshend volunteered and went ashore with part of their crews to supervise the battery's emplacement and assist in the technical aspects of gunnery. These senior officers, by leaving junior officers in command of their vessels in an active war zone to build and man batteries on land, clearly indicates naval cooperation, and even enthusiasm, in support of the ground component.⁹¹

Eighteenth century sieges were guided by the techniques pioneered and refined by the French engineer, Sebastien Leprestre de Vauban in his revolutionary work, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification. The science of siege warfare played a major role on Europe's battlefields. The sophisticated and formidable Castillo de San Marcos would have been at home on any European frontier, indeed being constructed of Coquina, made it less susceptible to cannon fire. The soft-shell stone simply absorbed cannonballs and did not fracture, therefore making a breach very difficult.⁹² Oglethorpe's early continental military experiences, most notably under Eugene of Savoy, gave him the basis of a sound military education. To his credit he was rather widely read in military tactics and science, although lacking in command experience of large forces.⁹³ Yet his failure to deploy with the necessary engineers, sappers, and miners required for a siege clearly contributed to Montiano's victory. The construction of the needed parallels, revetments, approach saps, and gun batteries, necessitates having the adequate means and skilled labor to do so. Yet on the troop list for the expedition, no more than two engineers

were carried on the musters nor were there sufficient tools.⁹⁴ In retrospect Oglethorpe later admitted, "After I left Charlestown and before we could invest the place, the half-galleys got in from Cuba; we had no pioneers to open trenches, no engineers but Colonel Cook and Mr. Mace, no bombardiers nor gunners that understood the service, and no sufficient train."⁹⁵ This critical lack of the necessary implements and expertise for the expedition is a major reason for its failure. Oglethorpe took a gamble, and unfortunately for him, luck was not on his side.


Oglethorpe was remiss in that the expedition to seize the formidable Vauban style San Marcos' Castillo was undertaken without having the necessary siege train on hand. Oglethorpe had planned to besiege the Castillo if necessary, but the supplies and equipment for a formal siege were not available until after Oglethorpe had called off the expedition.⁹⁶ Oglethorpe undoubtedly was surprised at Montiano's stout defense and remarkably successful spoiling attack on Fort Mose. The Cuban half galleys gave the tactical initiative to the Spanish and denied the British their most potent weapons, their Man-O-Wars.⁹⁷ Respected Naval Historian, Admiral Herbert W. Richmond, in his classic, **The Navy in the War of 1739-48**, unjustly maligns Pearce and his squadron's role in the expedition,⁹⁸ and his negative opinion is indicative of the view shared by other contemporary naval historians.⁹⁹ Yet, in a closer examination of this abortive expedition, a more gentle, indeed laudable reappraisal, is due to Pearce and his Royal Naval squadron.

Oglethorpe's failure was later mitigated by his narrowly successful defense of Georgia and victory at the battle of Bloody Marsh in 1742 from a revenge seeking Montiano.¹⁰⁰ To Oglethorpe's clear credit the 1740 siege of St. Augustine and his second

attempt in taking it in 1743 were the only two blemishes on an otherwise credible military record. The Royal Navy and other British land forces enjoyed better results in the Caribbean and in Canada during in latter course of the war than they did in the former at St. Augustine. It is undoubtedly these events that helped diminish Pearce's contributions and his squadrons role "off the barr of the Mantanzas" at St. Augustine and eclipsed the excellent support rendered by the naval arm of Oglethorpe's expedition.

Contributing to the generally negative review of Pearce and his squadron was the impact of friction with colonial civil authorities. Following the failed siege, Pearce and his naval subordinates were the victims and sometimes provocateurs of civil-military friction. Press reports on the Royal Navy were often uncharitable by colonial newspapers. "The Boston Evening Post on 8 June 1741 reported sarcastically that Captain Pearce of the *H.M.S. Flamborough* had 'gallantly' seized two suspected merchant vessels in New York Harbor 'without the loss of a man.'"¹⁰¹ In May 1740 at Savannah, during preparation for the siege, local authorities and Captain George Townshend of the *H.M.S. Tartar* became embroiled over jurisdiction in a case of a press gang's over zealousness. Townsend was soon to sail into combat against the Spanish and was short sailors. An impressment gang from the *H.M.S. Tartar* assaulted a group of merchant seamen who were trying to avoid service by hiding in a locked storeroom aboard an anchored merchant vessel, the *Caesar*. Townshend's men, led by sailor Samuel Bathurst, assaulted the hapless sailors and in a dark melee, inadvertently killed one. South Carolina Lieutenant Governor William Bull attempted to have Bathurst arrested and tried in a civil court for murder. However Captain Townshend simply slipped his mooring and

A VIEW of the TOWN and CASTLE of ST. AUGUSTINE.
and the **ENGLISH CAMP** before it June 20. 1740. by **THO^a SILVER.**



A The English South Trench 7. 3. 18 & 2 small Mortars
B A Marsh from whence we played with 20 Colours
C Eustatia Island, which is chiefly Sand & Bushes
D Sailors hunting Cannon, in reach of the Castle
E A North Trench 3 18 & a Mortar of 26 & 20 lb
F Genl Oglethorpe's Soldiers, Indians & Sailors Tents
G A Lookout takes the 12th of June
H Soldiers and Sailors landing June the 21st
I A Sand Battery gained as our approach
K Capl Warrens Commander over the Sailors hoisting
the Union Flag on board a Schooner
L The Sailors walk to Water the Shipping
1. Flamborough 2. Harrier 3. Squirrel
Ships 4. Tartar 5. Fishers,
Sloop 6. Wolf 7. Spruce
Employ'd on this Expedition about 200 Seamen
and Soldiers and 300 Indians
Pieces of the Spaniards 1000 besides a strong Co. of
and a Fortified Bank and a shallow River hindering
our Shipping's Playing in them

Account of the Siege of St. Augustine de a Letter from an English Officer
May 30 we arrived near St. Augustine, June 1st were joined by the
Flamborough, Capl Farris, the Phoenix, Capl Fancher, the Tartar,
Capl Dorrance, and the Squirrel, Capl Warren of 30 Guns each, be-
sides the Spanish Ship Capl Larr and the Wolf, Capl Handgrip.
On the 2nd of June we landed with 300 Carolina Soldiers appeared
at the North of the Town. On the 3rd Genl Oglethorpe came by Sea
with 300 Soldiers and 300 Indians from Georgia. On the 10th they
were carried a Shore in the Men of War boats under the cover of
the small Ship Guns. They landed on the Island Eustatia with-
out Opposition and took the Land on G.
The 11th Capl Warren in a Schooner and other small Ships and
Prigunners anchored in their Harbour just out of Cannon shot till
the 21st when the Sailors were employed in landing Ordnance and
other Stores within Reach of the Enemy Cannon, on which occasion
they discover'd a surprising spirit and intrepidity. The same night two
Batteries were raised, but too far off.
The 27th the General command'd the Garrison to Surrender who
and went he should be glad to shake hands with him in his Castle.
This happy issue was counteract'd by a dear bought Victory, which
100 Spaniards had obtained over 60 Englishers 40 of whom were
killed, but did the Spaniards killing their number.
The 29th had another obliged the men of War to put out of it
but one more had been killed. However the Siege was raised.

OGLETHORPE'S FLEET BEFORE ST. AUGUSTINE

headed towards St. Augustine with his new crewmembers to take part in the luckless siege.¹⁰² Such contempt for local authority increased the unpopularity of the Royal Navy in the colonies and served as a festering germ of dissents in the future American Revolution.¹⁰³ Incidents such as these made for bad press and may have contributed to poor contemporary and historical hindsight, all of which were almost uniformly negative to Pearce and his subordinate naval commanders in the ill planned expedition to siege the Castillo de San Marcos in St. Augustine.¹⁰⁴

CHAPTER FOUR: "Paradise Lost"

British failure at St. Augustine was due to the combination of many factors. A lack of adequate and speedy preparation figures as one of the most prominent. If a fast, mobile 'strike force' could have been assembled and transported to the area of operations, then Oglethorpe may have been able to surprise and seize the Castillo San Marcos and would not have had to depend upon a siege for its capitulation. Montiano lacked a robust defensive force and if surprised, may have lost the natural advantages endemic to a defender to an aggressive and fast moving British offensive.

Another important factor in this particular British military joint offensive was the failure of Oglethorpe to attain unity of command. While it would take another century to quantify the 'principles of war' it is plainly evident that by not achieving unity of effort nor command in a joint operation then the mission's methodology would be subject to the whims of the other component commander's interpretation. The lack of a definite and mutually agreed upon language for operations may have added to command confusion and possibly contributed to miscommunication.

Also critical to Montaino's success was the under estimation of his capabilities by Oglethorpe. Spanish resolve and offensive abilities, such as the devastating spoiling attack upon Fort Mose, demonstrated the aggressiveness and competence of Oglethorpe's enemy. The defensive enhancements wrought by Montiano and his engineers made Oglethorpe's undertaking far more difficult.

The lack of sufficient regular troops and support from Britain was also a factor. One under strength regular infantry regiment was insufficient to carry off such a daring operation. Oglethorpe had to rely on colonial soldiers to gain a sufficient number of troops. The contempt felt by regulars against their civilian counterparts in the militia was widespread and played a role in the British dysfunction at Ft. Mose.

Relations between regulars and colonial militiamen were almost always less than professional. Leach, in his **Roots of Conflict**, uses good imagination in drawing together comments from regular British officers on the military qualities of American colonial militia in a timeless drawing room:

Brigadier James Wolfe--"The Americans are in general the most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive. There is no depending on them in action"; *Lord Loudoun*--"are the lowest dregs of the people, on which no dependence can be had, for the defense of any particular Post by themselves"; *General James Forbes*--"A gathering from the scum of the worst of people...the provincial officers, with few exceptions, are an extreme bad collection of broken Innkeepers, Horse Jockeys, and Indian Traders...you must drop a little of the gentleman and treat them as they deserve, and pardon no remissness in duty, as few or any serve from any principles but the low sordid ones." (Sic).¹⁰⁵

Compounding the difficulties of command and control of the mixed regular and militia force was the fact that the militias were from two different colonies. Personality conflicts between the Georgians and South Carolinians introduced additional friction and disunity. Following the expedition the two colonies were embroiled in a divisive press war with each side attempting to lay the expedition's failure upon the other.¹⁰⁶


South Carolina's dalliance in approving the expedition while Montiano's garrison was in a weakened condition also contributed to the loss. Had the South Carolina Assembly voted to support the expedition immediately after the declaration of war,

Oglethorpe could have used the Spring of 1740 as a much needed preparatory opportunity. By not giving official support until early April, Oglethorpe lost valuable training and planning time. Moreover, the expedition's logistical challenges would have been simplified had sufficient time been available to collect supplies and equipment. This 'window of opportunity' closed by the South Carolina Legislature contributed to the expedition's failure.


Oglethorpe's tactical errors played an important role in the defeat as well. He left a vulnerable garrison at Ft. Mose and should have known of the frictions that the disparate groups of the small command experienced. Palmer was a weak commander and Oglethorpe should have put another officer in charge of the garrison. Curiously, Oglethorpe seemed to naively believe that he could bluff the Spanish into coming out of their formidable defensive works and fight his superior numbers in the open. This technique smacks of desperation and hope, and not of a calculated effort to lure the enemy to a battle site of Oglethorpe's time and choosing. In fact, when Oglethorpe returned to St. Augustine in 1743 he tried the same technique and fared no better. Oglethorpe had been to St. Augustine previous to the 1740 expedition and should have had some knowledge of the sand barrier at the bay's mouth. It seems incredible that he requested naval support in an area in which the navy could not influence. Finally, simply bad timing played a role. The hurricane seasons were extremely dangerous to the navy and because of the expedition's late start, the amount of time the ships could safely stay on station was minimized.¹⁰⁷

The British operation at St. Augustine provides a germane historical example of the special leadership challenges and operational difficulties associated with conducting

joint operations. It also serves to illustrate the eternal quandary of partitioning command and responsibilities between naval and land forces.¹⁰⁸ Oglethorpe's failed expedition highlighted the difficulties British colonies experienced in attaining unity of command and effort in their combined military endeavors in the unsophisticated environment of the Americas. The difficulties evidenced in this joint operation foreshadowed some of the future problems of the French and Indian War and the US War for Independence.¹⁰⁹



It can be convincingly argued that it was not for lack of naval support that doomed Britain's bid for Florida in 1740. It was rather, a combination of other factors that singly may not have stopped Oglethorpe, but in combination, produced enough friction to stymie victory and frustrate British efforts to expand their North American colonial empire.



Naval and Land Forces, St. Augustine, 1740 ¹¹⁰


General James Oglethorpe
Military Governor of Colonial Georgia



James Oglethorpe

Print from Johnson, Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats, 7.

Map of the Southeast United States¹¹¹



ENDNOTES

¹ For an excellent summary of the joint disaster of Gallipoli see Alan Moorehead's **Gallipoli**, New York, 1956.

² For an excellent treatment on British inter-service disharmony see Richard Harding, "*Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional and Technical Problems Concerning the Conduct of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century*", **The Historical Journal**, (London, 1989), 32, 1, 35-55.

³ See D. Edward Leach's **Roots of Conflict British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans 1677-1763**, (Chapel Hill, NC, 1986), 107-133, for superlative detail on British joint military operations in North America and in the Caribbean.

⁴ See George R. Fairbanks. **Florida Its History and Its Romance**. (Jacksonville, FL, 1901), 133-134.

⁵ See Reed Browning's **The War of Austrian Succession**. (New York, 1993), 9-31.

⁶ General James Oglethorpe founded the colony of Georgia in 1733, serving principally as a buffer state between the established Carolinas colonies and Spanish Florida. For more information on this eclectic man see Robert Wright, **A Memoir of General James Oglethorpe, One of the Earliest Reformers of Prison Discipline in England, and the Founder of Georgia, In America**, (London, 1867) also Amos A. Ettinger, **James Edward Oglethorpe, Imperial Idealist**, (Oxford, 1936).

⁷ See Kenneth Coleman. **Colonial Georgia A History**. (New York, 1976), 68. "If Oglethorpe is blamable, it is for not anticipating the difficulties the expedition might encounter."

⁸ See "*Letters of Montiano-Siege of St. Augustine*," **Collections of the Georgia Historical Society VII** (Savannah, 1909), 23-69. (Henceforth cited as "*Letters of Montiano*.")

⁹ Vauban style forts stud the frontiers of Europe, even today. Characterized by walls almost over twenty feet thick, mutually supporting fields of fire, surrounded by a moat, and armed with numerous cannon, these forts require a very dedicated effort to overtake. Spain built the Castillo de San Marcos and it still stands as an excellent example of a Vauban fort today. Probably the richest recent examination of Oglethorpe in colonial Georgia is Phinzy Spalding's, **Oglethorpe in America**, (Chicago, 1977). Spaulding has done a superlative job in combing the period's historiography concerning Oglethorpe. Using Ettinger's excellent but somewhat dated work, **James Edward Oglethorpe, Imperial Idealist** (1936) as a base document, Spalding has incorporated more recent finds covering the St. Augustine expedition and cleanly articulates the subsequent controversy over causality. "A regular pamphlet war broke out in London between the advocates of Oglethorpe and the supporters of Carolina. The air was filled with venom over this expedition-an expedition called by *The Champion* the most "romantic" and irregular in its leadership since a more famous one some years before Troy." Spalding, **Oglethorpe**, 119.

Spalding also discusses the naval role, "The behavior of the Royal Navy must also be put high on the list when considering reason for Oglethorpe's frustration. Pearce was constantly finding fault, and the warships, in effect, acted as a separate command...There was no reasoning with Pearce; no appeals, either from Vander Dussen or Oglethorpe, could touch him." Spalding, **Oglethorpe**, 121-22. Spalding's generally superior examination of the expedition's failure narrowly relies on Admiral H. W. Richmond's cursory synopsis in, **The Navy in the War of 1739-48**, (Cambridge, UK, 1920), 4 Vols., and does not use Pearce's log or the considerable comments from the **The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752**. Editor Julian Gwyn, (London, 1973) for balance. Thus the naval side of the expedition is judged almost solely from a land perspective...leading to this author's opinion that it is a one dimensional examination and lacks both the balance and benefit of the naval perspective.

¹⁰ Leach, **Roots of Conflict**, 130-131.

¹¹ For details on the role of St. Augustine and Fort San Marcos in Queen Anne's War (War of Spanish Succession in Europe) see Charles W. Arnade's **The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702**, (Gainesville, FL, 1959); for broader treatment see Verner W. Crane, "The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne's War", **The American Historical Review**, 24, (1919), 379-395.

¹² Treaty of Utrecht, 1713.

¹³ See Howard M. Chapin, **Privateering in King George's War 1739-1748**, (Providence, RI, 1928), 201-11; and Joyce Elizabeth Harman, **Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763**, (St. Augustine, FL, 1969), 33-43. For interesting insights into the life of an 'Anglopirate' in this period see Marcus Ridder "Under the Banner of King Death: The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716-1726", **The William and Mary Quarterly**, 38, (1981), 203-227.

¹⁴ Richmond, **The Navy in the War of 1739-48**, 1:4. "On April 9th 1731, a Spanish privateer captain named Fandino captured the *Rebecca*, Captain Jenkins, a ship belonging to Jamaica, which was on her way to England. The Spanish captain used Jenkins, 'in a most barbarous inhuman manner, taking all his money, cutting off one of his ears, plundering him of those necessities which were to carry the ship safe home.'" He cited Rear Admiral Stewart to the Governor of Havana, 12 September, 1731, as quoted in the **English Historical Review**, ud. For excellent detail on the growing state of tension which eventually led to war see John Tate Lanning, **The Diplomatic History of Georgia-A Study of the Epoch of Jenkin's Ear**. (Chapel Hill, NC, 1936), 154-204.

¹⁵ Ibid., 5. "It was with relations between the two powers in the highly strained condition described above that Captain Jenkins is said to have made his celebrated speech in March 1738." Jenkin's character and veracity came under attack after the initial outpouring of understandable sympathy. "Whether or not he still possessed his ear is unimportant, since by the decisive parliamentary session of 1739, which brought on the war, 'Jenkin's Ear' was a stale catch-phrase, while 'Spanish Depredations' remained as fresh as ever." See Philip L. Woodfine, "The War of Jenkin's Ear: A New Voice in the Wentworth-Vernon Debate," **Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research** LXV, 262, (London, 1987), 70.

¹⁶ The British in 1740 still used the Julian calendar while the Spanish had adopted the modern Gregorian calendar. Thus, Spanish dated accounts are eleven days ahead of a comparable British date accounts of the siege.

¹⁷ See John Jay Tepaske, **The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763**, (Durham, NC, 1964) 137-39; see also Larry Ivers, "The Battle of Ft. Mosa," **The Georgia Historical Quarterly**, 1 (Athens, GA, 1967), 135. This preemptive Cuban raid was to be executed in 1738.

¹⁸ For details on Spanish/Anglo disharmony in the New World from 1700 until the conclusion of the War of Jenkin's Ear see James Leitch Wright Jr.'s, **Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America**, (Athens, GA, 1971), 75-100.

¹⁹ "From the spring of 1739 war with Spain seemed highly likely, and from May all but inevitable. A pre-emptive offensive strike against Spain for which the Navy was the ideal weapon, was eagerly considered." Philip Woodfine, "Ideas on Naval Power and the Conflict with Spain, 1737-1742," **The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century**, ed. Philip Woodfine and Jeremy Black. (Leicester, UK, 1988), 76.

²⁰ Verne E. Chatelain, **The Defenses of Spanish Florida 1565 to 1763**, (Washington, DC, 1941), 75-83.

²¹ The Gulf Stream made possible a faster passage to Europe. Control of the straits would enable the holder to patrol a much smaller area for lucrative targets, see Leach, **Arms for Empire**, 211.

²² Oglethorpe successfully petitioned King George II, in a personal audience, to provide him a Regiment of regulars to protect the fledgling colony. By 1738 the 42nd Regiment of Foote was serving in Georgia with an authorized strength of 684 officers and men, with Oglethorpe being recognized as the "Colonel of the Regiment." "Ranging Companies" (Rangers) were also formed and gave the combative Georgians additional tactical flexibility. For an excellent treatment on Georgia's colonial military establishment see James M. Johnson, **Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats-The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776**, (Macon, GA, 1992), 1-24. Once Oglethorpe had the necessary regulars, all did not go well. Disharmony was a problem among the officers as well as the men, an extreme example was when the commanding Lieutenant Colonel struck a Captain for no good reason with a "great stick." See Wright, **Memoirs**, 210-213.

²³ For details on Fort San Marcos see Luis Rafael Arana and Albert Manucy's, **The Building of Castillo de San Marcos**, (Washington, DC, 1977) 25-50, also see Douglas E. Leach **Arms of Empire A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 1607-1763**. (New York, 1973), 213; and Wright, **Memoirs**, 213.

²⁴ Richmond, **The Navy**, 1:4.

²⁵ Oglethorpe in 1739 successfully led a diplomatic mission among the Indians of Georgia's western and southern borders in order to guarantee peace and flank security for Georgia while he was fighting the Spanish in Florida, see Leach, **Arms for Empire**, 211-212.

²⁶ Wright, **Memoirs**, 237.

²⁷ Larry E. Ivers, **British Drums on the Southern Frontier, The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749**, (Chapel Hill, NC, 1974), 91-95.

²⁸ Ivers, **Fort Mose**, 136.

²⁹ Ivers, **British Drums**, 98, also Trevor Richard Reese, **Colonial Georgia A Study in British Imperial Policy in the Eighteenth Century**, (Athens, GA, 1963), 178.

³⁰ Ibid. The South Carolinians clearly got the worst of the bargain. The total cost of the St. Augustine expedition came to a hefty £24,04000.00. As late as 1749 claims were being made for payment of debts incurred towards the expedition. See J. H. Easterby (Editor), **The Colonial Records of South Carolina The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly March 28, 1749-March 19, 1750**. (Columbia, SC, 1962), 136-137; 318-320; 343-347.

³¹ Reese, **Colonial Georgia**, 77-78. Great Britain was in a continual quandary as to how to best defend her growing colonial possessions with her thinly stretched navy. Putting Royal Navy ships on temporary station at a colony was the preferred method for providing a naval presence, at least up until Jenkin's War. Due to budget constraints Great Britain only kept one 'regular' squadron in Jamaica, the rest of her American colonies had only temporary escort ships on station for naval protection. Thus, when Captain Pearce became acting station commodore his naval assets were cobbled together from as far away as New England. This makeshift task organization may have lessened cohesion and efficiency. See G. S. Graham, "The Naval Defense of British North America 1739-1763", **Transactions of the Royal Historical Society**, (London, 1948), Vol. 30, 95-110.

³² The small Squadron under Pearce was made up of the following: ship name, their number of guns, followed by their commander's name: "**Flamborough**, 20, Captain Vincent Pearce; **Hector**, 44, Sir Yelverton Peyton; **Squirrel**, 20, Captain Peter Warren; **Phoenix**, 20, Captain Charles Faushaw; **Tartar**, 22, Captain George Townshend; **Spence**, 6 guns and ten Swivels, Captain William Laws; **Wolf**, 8, Commander William Dandridge, **Hawk**, 6, LT Henry Bruce, and a light schooner **Hawk** of 8 guns," see William Laird Clowes, **The Royal Navy A History from the Earliest Times to the Present**, (London, 1898), III, 269 and W.E. May, "His Majesty's Ships of the Carolina Station", **South Carolina Historical Magazine**, (Charleston, SC, 1970), Vol. 71, 162-69.

³³ **The Saint Augustine Expedition of 1740 A Report to the South Carolina General Assembly**. Reprinted from the colonial records of South Carolina, with and introduction by John T. Lanning. (Columbia, SC, 1954), 16.

³⁴ In a letter to Newcastle on 1 April 1740, Oglethorpe wrote of Pearce, "...is extraordinarily zealous and active in his Majesty's service...", Wright, **Memoirs**, 239.

³⁵ **Public Records Office, Kew Gardens London**, Admiralty (henceforth cited as P.R.O., ADM) 1/2284, Governor William Bull to Oglethorpe, 7 April 1740.

³⁶ Ivers, **British Drums**, 102-04.

³⁷ See Claude C. Sturgill and E.R. Turner's "*The Importance of Being at War: General James Oglethorpe's Accounts and Imperial Affairs in Early Colonial Georgia*," **Military Affairs**, (October 1976), XXXX, No. 3, 130-33.

³⁸ See the **South Carolina Gazette**, 10 April 1740, for Oglethorpe's public petition for support and for recruiting.

³⁹ Sturgil and Turner, "*The Importance at Being at War*," **Military Affairs**, 130.

⁴⁰ Arana and Mauncy, **The Building**, 43-6.

⁴¹ See Chatelain, **The Defenses of Spanish Florida**, 165. Montiano's troop list included, 960 men of whom 200 were armed Negroes, 100 cavalry, and 100 artillerymen. The Cuban half galleys, which arrived just before Oglethorpe's expedition, added 200 more men.

⁴² "*Letters of Montiano*", **Georgia Historical Society**, Montiano to Cuban Governor, 25 March 1740.

⁴³ Ivers, **British Drums**, 103-04.

⁴⁴ "*Letters of Montiano*", **Georgia Historical Society**, Montiano to Cuban Governor, 27 April 1740.

⁴⁵ See Chatelain, **The Defenses of Spanish Florida**, 163-69.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Montiano to Cuban Governor, 13 May 1740.

⁴⁷ For details on Oglethorpe's recruiting efforts see Ivers, **British Drums**, 99-103. Despite raising an adequate infantry force, he neglected to procure any sappers or miners, an absolutely necessary military skill for besieging a Vauban fortress. Oglethorpe's total land strength, minus naval augmentation, was around 2,000. See Chatelain, **The Spanish Defenses of Florida**, 165.

⁴⁸ Sturgil and Turner, "*The Importance at Being at War*," **Military Affairs**, 130

⁴⁹ The march south and later north was difficult, numerous swamps, bad water, and clouds of mosquitoes made the movement onerous. "...and the men were fatigued with frequent and long marches in the extremity of the heat of summer having scarce any victuals along with them and scarce so much as a drink of water that but Brackish water which cast them into fluxes..." (sic), see letter from Thomas Burton to his brother Richard Burton, 21 October 1740, **South Carolina Historical Society**, archival number 35.

⁵⁰ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ships Log of Pearce's ship *Flamborough*, 2 May 1740.

⁵¹ P.R.O., ADM, 1/2284, Ships log, *Flamborough*, 8 May 1740.

⁵² P.R.O., ADM, 1/2284, Ships log, *Flamborough*, 13 May 1740.

⁵³ Oglethorpe's prisoner related to the surrounded Spanish garrison that they would get good treatment and as a result, Fort Diego fell without a protracted battle on 10 May 1740. The British detachment, which served as the new garrison, was under Captain William Dunbar. The small garrison's mission was to provide for rear security while Oglethorpe and the rest of the expedition went further south. See Ivers, **British Drums**, 106.

⁵⁴ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ship's log, *Flamborough*, 18 May 1740; see also Ivers, **British Drums**, 107.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 106-07.

⁵⁶ See the **University of Florida Library (Gainesville)**, **Stedson Collection**, Box 45, August 1739-August 1741, Reel 45, Letter of Montiano to Guemes y Horcasitas, 20 August 1740.

⁵⁷ George Cadogan, **The Spanish Hireling detected, being a refutation of the several calumnies and falsehoods in a late pamphlet, entitl'd An impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe...**, (London, 1743), 26, also "A *Ranger's Report of Travels with General Oglethorpe in Georgia and Florida, 1739-1742*," **Travels in the American Colonies**, edited by Newton D. Mereness, (New York, 1961), 228.

⁵⁸ Ivers, **British Drums**, 138-40.

⁵⁹ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 111-112.

⁶⁰ Oglethorpe would again try the same tactic, with the same disappointing results, in 1743 in a second attempt to take the Castillo.

⁶¹ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 109.

⁶² P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ships Log, *Flamborough*, 5 June 1740.

⁶³ Manned by South Carolina militiamen.

⁶⁴ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 126.

⁶⁵ "Letters of Montiano", **Georgia Historical Society**, Montiano to Cuban Governor, 6 July 1740, 56-8. Salgado correctly abandoned the fort after dawn, since he lacked the necessary troops and artillery to hold it against superior British numbers.

⁶⁶ "From Mosa on, all was anticlimax. On the day following, Vander Dussen and Lieutenant Colonel William Cook visited Oglethorpe on Anastasia and "found Things in a good deal of Distraction; Resolutions taken and not put in Execution."" Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 112.

⁶⁷ In his correspondence, Oglethorpe dismissed the seriousness of the loss at Ft. Mose and lightly treated the incident, "We have had a small loss at Moosa as I mentioned in my last.", Oglethorpe to Bull, 24 June 1740, **A Report to the South Carolina Assembly**, 149. Palmer, the commander of the garrison, was also slain.

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- ⁶⁸ Cadogan, Spanish Hireling, 45.
- ⁶⁹ Oglethorpe to Bull, 24 June 1740, A Report to the South Carolina General Assembly, 149.
- ⁷⁰ Ivers, British Drums, 127, "During the meeting Vander Dussen recommended the following: first, to complete the batteries quickly; second, to attack and destroy the half-galleys; third, to transport half the army and the Indians to the mainland; and fourth, to attack the town."
- ⁷¹ In retrospect British naval Captain Peter Warren wrote, "That poor colony (South Carolina, sic.) must be in great distress upon this occasion, as well as that of their expense and disappointment **in the ill-concerted and worse conducted attack on St. Augustine. I hope I shall never have any part in such an expedition again**" (sic., and this author's boldface). See Warren to Bakers, 5 March 1741, HMS Squirrel off Jamaica, The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752. Editor Julian Gwyn, (London, 1973), 24.
- ⁷² A Report to The South Carolina General Assembly, Mr. Gordon's Journal, 25 June 1740, 149.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ A Report to The South Carolina General Assembly, Vander Dussen to Pearce, 25 June 1740, 150.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Vander Dussen to Pearce, 27 June 1740.
- ⁷⁹ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ships Log, Flamborough, 1 July 1740, "...made a signal for all Captains, and examined before them the ___ of the Phoenix and Wolf Sloop, who this day sounded the barr of Mantanzas, who say, that the channel is so very narrow, that it is too dangerous to carry a Man of War Sloop over, that if they got in they could not be moored."
- ⁸⁰ P.R.O., ADM, 1/2284, Ships Log, Flamborough, 28-30 June 1740.
- ⁸¹ It is unclear why the HMS Phoenix left station when she may have been able to sight the approaching vessels. Possibly, the growing storm may have made positive identification impossible or that the selfsame weather that caused them to join the squadron might be trusted to destroy the approaching craft. In an amazing coincidence, the naval commander for this seven ship Cuban supply convoy was the same man who had cut of "Jenkins Ear" some years earlier!
- ⁸² "Letters of Montiano", Georgia Historical Society, Montiano to the Cuban Governor, 6 August 1740; see also A Report to The South Carolina General Assembly, Vander Dussen to Bull, 3 July 1740.

⁸³ "Letters of Montiano," Georgia Historical Society, Montiano to the Cuban Governor, 30 June 1740, "My greatest concern is for supplies, and if we get none, there no doubt we shall die of hunger." After the convoys arrival Montiano was much more confident. "Luis Gomez arrived at this place, with intelligence that he left within the bar of Mosquitoes, three sloop, one small sloop, and two schooners, with provisions sent by your Excellency, in charge of Juan de Oxeda, and addressed to Captain Don Manuel de Villasante. The pleasure with which I received this news is indescribable." See Montiano to the Cuban Governor, 6 August 1740. Despite some worries over off loading, the timely arrival granted success to the garrison.

⁸⁴ A Report to The South Carolina General Assembly, Oglethorpe to Pearce, 2 July 1740. A great deal of animosity would characterize the relationship between South Carolina and Georgia over the next several years that degenerated into a hotly vocal and divisive press war. A contemporary historian of the time noted the conflicting charges and counter charges among the colonies as well as between the two regular services, "The unhappy expedition against St. Augustine lies under the same disadvantage to writers and readers, and the true part of the account being the retreat of the English with loss, the English reader will not be at all sorry that we will say no more of it." John Oldmixon, The British Empire in America Containing The History of the Discovery, Settlement, Progress and State of the British Colonies on the Continent and Islands of America. (London, 1741), I:539. 2 vols., reprinted in New York, Kelley Publishers, 1969.

⁸⁵ Oglethorpe clearly knew of the restrictive nature of the many bays and river mouths in North Florida and that shallow draft boats were a necessity for any type of joint operation, boats the Royal Navy did not have in the American Colonies. "The launches from Augustine can run into almost every inlet in the Province, therefore it is absolutely necessity that the Trustees should apply to Parliament for at least five ten-oared boats and a troop of rangers" Letter from Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 8 October 1739, Wright, Memoirs, 227.

⁸⁶ Coleman, Colonial Georgia, 68.

⁸⁷ "To these reasons may be added the *Colchefer* Man Of War of 50 guns, dispatched from England in October preceding, neglecting to come to St. Augustine with the orders to the Fernal sea-officers to give all allegiance to the enterprise: it is certain had he proceeded to Georgia instead of Virginia, and staying there, the addition of boats and men would have forwarded the attacking of the Spanish Galleys, on which the success of the expedition so much depended; *and I cannot doubt but the sea-officers present would have ventured greater risks, had they received those orders, than they imagined they could do.*"(sic), See Cadogan, Spanish Hireling, 49. (this author's italics)

⁸⁸ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ships log, Flamborough, 24 June 1740.

⁸⁹ P.R.O., ADM 1/2284, Ships log, Flamborough, 20 May 1740-Prisoners of war taken on board, 23 on the Flamborough and 22 on the Phoenix; 28 May 1740-more Prisoners of war put on board; 25 May 1740-supplies delivered to Oglethorpe including 50 each six pound shot and 100 swivel gun rounds; 4 June 1740- Tartar delivers more cannon to Oglethorpe; 13 June 1740- Wolf lands more cannon for Oglethorpe; 13 June 1740-Oglethorpe salutes Pearce and his squadron with a five gun salute of thanks.

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- ⁹⁰ Warren, **The Royal Navy and North America, *Flamborough***, 3 July 1740, 22-23.
- ⁹¹ P.R.O., ADM, 1/2284, Ships log, **Flamborough**, 12 June 1740. Pearce's squadron also lost three 6-pound cannons to the land component's failure to evacuate the borrowed pieces. The guns were buried in the sand of Anastasia Island along with valuable stores, weapons, and other scarce equipment. See Ricardo Torres-Reyes. **The British Siege of St. Augustine in 1740**. (Denver, 1972), 77.
- ⁹² Fairbanks, **Florida**, 140.
- ⁹³ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 120.
- ⁹⁴ Cadogan, **Spanish Hireling**, 27, "300 pioneers promised but none never got."
- ⁹⁵ Wright, **A Memoir of General James Oglethorpe**, Oglethorpe to Bull, 19 July 1740, 257. The formal siege lasted 38 days.
- ⁹⁶ **A Report to The South Carolina General Assembly**, Bull to Vander Dussen, 9 July 1740, 166. "Captain Walker's schooner will be ready in two or three days. I shall send in her Captain McNeal and his Company, a Master and sailing crew, six nine pounders (that she may withstand the Galleys on Occasion), twelve or fourteen Swivel Guns, some Plank &c."
- ⁹⁷ "Your Excellency may believe that the galliots [half galleys] have been of great service to me: for if the siege had caught me without them, the English would have given me much work to do..." Montiano to Guemes y Horcasitas, 28 July 1740, "**Letters of Montiano**", **Georgia Historical Society**, 60-62.
- ⁹⁸ Richmond, **The Navy**, I:50.
- ⁹⁹ Clowes, **The Royal Navy**, III: 270, "Pearce, however, was adverse from taking the risk; possibly he had doubts of the deserters; and he persisted in his refusal though the land officers offered to put one hundred soldiers into the boats."
- ¹⁰⁰ See Edward Kimball, **A Relation, or Journal of a Late Expedition, &. A Facsimile Reproduction of the 1744 Edition with an Introduction and Index by John Jay Tepaske**. (Gainesville, FL, 1976).
- ¹⁰¹ Leach, **Roots of Conflict**, 136.
- ¹⁰² Ibid., 148-149.
- ¹⁰³ D. E. Leach, "**Brothers in Arms? Anglo-American Frustration at Louisburg 1745-1746**", **Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society**, (Boston, 1978), Vol. 89, 36-54.
- ¹⁰⁴ Captain Peter Warren, of the *Squirrel*, did especially well after the expedition. By 1744 he was promoted to Admiral and by 1752 had retired as a Vice-Admiral of the Red. He died quite wealthy--made possible by his shrewd business sense and good fortune in garnering prize money. For an interesting work on this sea going capitalist see Julian Gwyn, **The Enterprising**

Admiral The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren. (Montreal, 1974). Captain Charles Fanshawe, of the *Phoenix*, retired as a Rear Admiral in 1747; Captain William Danridge of the *Wolf* died in 1747; Captain Sir Yelverton Peyton of the *Hector*, was dismissed from service via court martial and died in 1749; Captain George Townsend of the *Tartar* retired as a full Admiral in 1765; Captain William Laws of the *Spence*, became a superannuated Rear Admiral in 1747; Captain Vincent Pearce of the *Flamborough*, married the daughter of the governor of New Jersey and died in 1745 at the age of 65.

¹⁰⁵ Leach, **Roots of Conflict**, 130-131.

¹⁰⁶ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 119.

¹⁰⁷ Spaulding, **Oglethorpe**, 119-126, for an excellent summary.

¹⁰⁸ Christian Buchet, "The Royal Navy and the Caribbean, 1689-1763," **The Mariner' Mirror** Vol. 80, Number 1, (1994), 30-44.

¹⁰⁹ As William Pitt the Elder later opined in the Seven Years War, the Sprit of Quebec should guide colonial and regular joint operations in subsequent actions.

¹¹⁰ All photos and diagrams by author unless otherwise stated.

¹¹¹ Map Clip Art from the Maps section and the old ship photo is from the nautical section of the "Graphic Pack, 10,000 Image". Volume 3. Media Graphics International © 1997, Arvada, Co.

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Author's Biographical Sketch:



Major James P. Herson, Jr. was born in the Bronx, New York and graduated with high honors and as a distinguished military graduate from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1980. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry, he went on to earn a Bachelor's degree in History, graduating with highest honors from Northwestern Oklahoma State University in 1982. Successfully completing the Infantry Officer's Basic Course and airborne training, he then served in the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) as a Rifle and Weapons Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, Battalion Maintenance Officer, and Battalion S4 in the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment (The Tomahawks).

Following the Infantry Officers Advanced Course he completed Ranger School and was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (The Iron Rangers) in the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) in Germany in 1986. While assigned to the 1/16th Infantry, then Captain Herson served as the Battalion Adjutant, Commander of Charlie Company, and as an Assistant Battalion S3. Following his tour in Germany he attended graduate school at the Florida State University where he earned a Masters Degree in History and completed all the course work and oral and written exams for the Doctorate. While an Assistant Professor of History at the US Military Academy for three years, he earned a teaching excellence award in History, a Certificate of Advanced Study in Secondary Education with distinction from St. Thomas Aquinas College, and was awarded the prestigious US Marine Corps Dissertation Fellowship from the USMC Historical Association.

Branch transferring to the US Army Transportation Corps in the summer of 1995, Major Herson was immediately reassigned as the Battalion Executive Officer of the 181st Transportation Battalion (The Road Warriors) of Germany based 3rd Corps Support Command. In December 1995 Major Herson deployed with his battalion first to Hungary and then on to the former Yugoslavia as part of the NATO Implementation Force for Operation Joint Endeavor. Returning to Germany almost one year later, Major Herson remained as the Battalion Executive Officer until he was reassigned to Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas to directly enter the US Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in May 1997. Following his completion of SAMS in May 1998 Major Herson will be assigned to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps as a military planner. Major Herson is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College's Defense Strategy Course. His awards and decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Army Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Expert Infantrymen's Badge, Air Assault and Airborne Badge.